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The author pr~:sems the central posrulatc:s from the latest workr by John 
R.~wls .~nd Michael W.~lzer .1s the most proiJJJiJent rqm.>seJJtotives of !J11er<J!ism 
.111d conmwnirarian£m1 1;1 the conrcmporary American polirkaf philosophy and 
points to their prcdcces.mrs .wd pamllc~L~ in pnlitic!1l philosoph;~ from Knnr muf 
Hegel to l'vfifl ;md Dewey. Siuce liberals and communitanl/JJS ol today do not 
any longer advocate a ·-society" or a "community" in the tr.1ditional sense, hut 
tile ''posttraditiruml" b1~t~raf democratic cvmrnunity Ill which liber11l prindplcs of 
justice and human rights can be realized, tbek d1inking if inccrcsting alm to 
those peoples who h.we set out to build liberaf-democratic sodeties uutside fht: 
sb1tes· of developed West. Naturally, the realization of freedom and hum:w 
rights dcpr::nds on the cultural tradition of rMch people .1nd no the bistorical 
"lefWI1SWe/f" JiJ gt.:nr::raf, but afS(I WI (IJI:l l'lTfUeS of ffbt:.rof citizens WhO, ID 8 
communal political life, realize "postu/,1tcs of communality_ cornpr£w~d in liberal-
ism ., (Walzer) and tlw.~ fnscer .1 frer .111d good !Jum<111 life. 
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As a political slogan, liberalilo:m emerged as late as the 19th c.entUI-y; as 
a culturaJ phenomenon it has had a long history, palticularly in the his-
tory of European philosophy. This is corrobnratt:J hy th e fact that some 
liberals s till refer to idealism, from Plato vja D escartes to Kant. ln the 
early 1930s, Edmund Husser! was able to set forth a nd expostui<Ltc the 
primal /ebenswelt as a fn :e pre-scientific life by reverting to Descartes and 
the modem-age pbiJosophy of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Today's 
liberals have tried the same by reverting to Kan t's transcendental philoso-
phy anJ J t:vt:loping it further by means of the contemporary philosophy 
of intersubjectivity. It is well-known that these attempts in a way represent 
the last transcendental fundament and that liberals have been forced to 
develop the philosophy of intersubjectivity as a means of overcoming the 
Cartesian egological and .Kantian transcendental consciousness. This inter-
subjectivity, however, has remained at the level of inner intersubjectivity 
which o nly shows the political and historical intricacies of human practical 
life instead of showing how people can politically realize their freedom 
and concretely and histnricaJiy materialize it in the fo rm of a good and 
free life. 
T he creation, realization and materialization of a good and free human 
life has always heen <~ subject of practi.cal philosophy. In that sense one 
has to agree with Wolfgang Kersting when he says that Lhe present-day 
debate between the " liberals" and the "commun itarians" belongs to the 
history of p ractical philosophy and that "both the contemporary Iihcralism 
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and the communitarianism... are theoretical acbievemenL'i of limited ongt-
nality", since both represent "renaissance phenomena" .1 Of course, the 
central issue is what is being rcnewell, restored, and rehabilitated and 
which traditions these separate developments of contemporary political 
philosophy ;md culture in general continue. One should agree with 
Kersting's conclusion: "If we wanted to describe the historical precursors 
ami the pnraUds of this debate" between the liberals and the commnni-
tarians "we would have to indmlt: almost the entire history of practical 
philosophy of modern age" and that " tbe consistently most exacting mani-
festation of that paralfi!,rrrlatic rivahy is undoubtedly the controversy be-
tween the Kant ian and the Hegelian philosophy. "2 
This L-. not the time to go deeper into Kersting's assessment of neo-
Kantian and nee-Hegelian philosophy, though it is extremely important, 
both for its evalu ation of liberalism and communitarianism as theories nf 
contemporary political philosophy and for their attitude towards concrete 
politics. Truth to tell, libe ralism as a cn11cept should not be restricted to 
a single period of political history and culture of the world or Europe, 
even les.~ to another continent's, or to a trend of modern politic.al think-
ing and living, and particularly lo <~ polilicnl parly or politic.<>. However, 
regarding the concre.te politics in our century it could be said that at the 
beginning of the 20th century some liberals adopted the "idea of political 
coopera tion with social democrats'? while at the end of lhal snrne ceH-
tury the theoreticians of liberalism opened themselves to the concept of 
contemporary lihcrnl sncit:ty iiS pluralist i.e. Jjberal and democraHc society 
as the politica l community of the developed western world. In that con-
text one should view the thesis about the "second round" of the show-
down between libe ra lism and communitarianism tollay, whil:h Axel Honne th 
desctibes in the following manner: "Liberals, if they have gone through 
Rawls' contextual rt:versal, agree with conunu11itarians when they say that 
the functional ability of modem democracy cannot he guaranteed without 
a certain degree of communal linkage to the aU-inclusive values, i.e. to 
lhe cullural communily or a way of life."4 
ln accordance with this view, today neithe r liberals nor communitarians 
can be viewed as "opposing camps" that solely and exclusively advocate 
either "a society" or "a community" in the trallitional sense, since both 
W. Kersting, " Die Liheralismus-Kommuoilarismus-Kontrovcrsc in dcr 
amerikanischen praktischeu Puilosophie", in: Jahrbuch fw: Po/itisches Denken, 
19Yl., p. 85. 
2 Ibid. 
:3 See S. R. Vierhaus, "Liberalismus", in: 0 . Brunner (ed.), Geschichtliche 
Grundbcgriffc, vol. 3, Stullgurl, 1982, p. 783 unu on. 
4 A Honoetb (eel.), Kommunitarismus. Einc Dcbullf.: ubc:r die moralischen 
GrancJlagcn modc:r,11er GeseUescbaften, Campus, Frankfun, 1993, p. 1 o. 
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groups in their theories espouse the ·•concept of posuraditional, democratic 
community" as "a common value horizon" of liberal-democratic SOCteties in 
wh1ch liberal principles of ju rice, human rights and freedoms are realized. 
lo that way the differeu~ betwt..-cn the original lihcntl »ncl L'Ommonitarian 
a1tit11des had been outJined, but they no longer bold water. fhese differ-
ences can no longer be •·measured simply by the way in which nmehcu.ly 
auswer. the qw.: .. , lion whether normatively the adv»ntage is on the side of 
the liberal principle of freedom o r the concept of collective good, but 
only by the way somebody answers the 4uc.,Lion which common vaJues 
'\huulcl 'erve as the necessary pre requisites for implementing liberal princi-
ples of freedom and justice'' . .) Even John Rawls forwen t his nJCOTJ' of 
Justice: of 197 1, though Uwc Juslu-. Wenzel challenged that claim with a 
recent statement that R awls' a ttempt was not "a complete success" .6 In 
his work "The Idea of Political Liberalism" Rawls atlm ils tha i the original 
theory of justice was a "ulupian norian of a well-ordered ~ociery" . Hon-
neth and We.nzel point out that in some of his works from the eighties 
Rawls did make certain corrections uf his earlie r opinion/\ and thus en-
uhlud lihcnlls and communitarians to meet halfway in their definition of 
" the rype of collective values'' which a re able to morally sustain the in:-~ti­
tutions which guarantt::e civil freedoms. Nevertheless, they are stiJI bicker-
ing alxlllt the issue "which moral resources must be regarded essential for 
keepin~ a modem, differentiated community alivc''.1 
ln~tcatl nf general reflections on liberalism and communitarianism, sev-
eral thoughts from the la test works by John RaY.l\ ami Michael Walzer. 
the major represenlalive~ uf thc.'>C two developments in the contemporary 
American political philosophy, will be outlined in this te.x"t. AJso, the pro -
pects of tbe reception of this type of thinking in Furopean practical phi-
losophy an: to be dealt with. 
ln his recent essay "The Ideal of the Public Usc uf the Reason~. John 
RaY.Is points out that his purpo:-c: il> tn -rurmulate the idea of the public 
use of reru.un in an acceptable form as an element of the liberal political 
concept of justice.'' He emphasizes that the public u~>c of reason is an 
idiosyncrasy, a ''peculiarity of uemm.:ratic nations" and tha t the term "use" 
means " the usc of reason of equal citizens directed towards public gootl".s 
Rawls distinguishes the forms of the public w;c nf reason from '·non-
public use of reason in chu rches, universities and other associations of 
5 [bid. 
6 LJ. .1 . Wenzel, "Liberaler Glaube. John Rawh.' Idee des polirischen 
Liberolismus'', in : Ja.hrbucb fur Jlnliri~ches Denke.n, 1993, p. 191. 
7 A HooDet.h (ed-). Kow.JJJUiliton~mus, op. ciL, p. 15. 
8 J. Rawls, " Das Ideal del> oOcuLI.ichco Vcmu.nftgcbrauchs'', in: lnfnnnarinn 
Phl/nsoph1e, 1/ 1994, P- 5. 
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civil socie ty", since the public use of reason expresses its ideals and prin-
eiples " hy means of the political concept of justice and because of that 
these ideals and principles have to be understandahle to t~ll " citizens in a 
state. In that sense, the public use of reason of equal citizens in a 
"constitutional democracy" is tlin:cteJ towards "public good" as the good 
of aU citizens and thus could be called tbe pntctical-political use nf the 
reason, as opposed to its technical, aristocratic and autocratic abuse. Rawls 
says: ''If aristocratic and autocratic rebrimes renect on the public good at 
all, this occurs solely among the rulers, and not publicly". Contntry to 
that, the iJeal nf the public reason "by its essence and its content" is to 
be public; according to Rawls, public reason deseribes "what a weU-ur-
Jcrcd socie ty motivates and emboldens its members to do" . The public 
reason of a politically liberal society manifests and confirms itself a:-. 
·•reason of equal citizens, wl10 as a coJJective mutually exercise po litical 
pressure in the sense of Lhe last resort by passing Jaws aucl effectuating 
constitutional changes". Thus, according to Rawls, public reHson in " H con-
stitutional democracy is not a regulation" from above but depends on 
" I he ahililies of iL-; mcmhers" aJ> lrul! citizens ant.! on lht: ways in which 
they rea lize their "intellecrual ancl moral faculties".q 
Tl.ta t " inteiJectual and moral faculty'' of the publlc use of reason in a 
l.tberal socie ty is even more prominent in Rawls' definition nf " the cili-
zens' obligation"lO as a civility. By this he means " the llberal principle of 
legitimacy" of exercising political power anti dnul, which is, according to 
Rawls' political liberalism, "appropriate only when accompanied by a 
constitution for which we may reasonably expect to be recognized by all 
the citizens as comprising the principles and the ideals they hHve af-
firmed" .11 Rawls' distinction between the legal and the moral obligation is 
rather interesting since in exercising legitimate political authority our 
"moral (hut not legal) ohligation, nn the hasis of the ideal of the puhlic 
use of the reason, is to explain to others to what extent political prin-
ciples and programmes which we advocate in fundamental precepts rely on 
the politic<~ l values of public reason". 12 This recognition by all citizens of 
the confirmed ideals and principles as the moraJ foundation of o ur politi-
cal activities puLo; us, as reasonable and moral inJividllals, in the position 
that we can "reasonably" count on the "agreement of other" citizens as 
individuals, though they may "be proponents of different religious and 
philosophical views" l3 which "right fully plHy Hn imporhmf part" in polit:ie<1 l 
life, since " rhe variety of inteUecrual, religious and moral teachings which 
9 Ibid., p.S. 
10 lbid. 
I I lhid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 thid. 
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abound in democracy is not a tronsient historical pht:nomenon but a per-
manent trait of the puhlic mllnre of a democracy-'. 14 
From this last statement it ensues tbat it is po. sihlc fur somebody to 
believe that politicnl value com be ffillre broadly based but that it does 
not mean that " he/·be bas no t acknO\\)edged these values or that hc/)ohc 
would not recognize them as the conditinnl> for the public use of rea-
son'· . ts Ou tilt: other hand, this makes it clear "why not aU thost: situa-
t inns in which citizens as the last resort mutuaUy exercise wercive author-
ity", but only political basics which arc linked with " the coUective power 
of free and cqmll citizens" are subjected to public reason. Hence, he goc)\ 
on ro say, " the limits o f the public use of reason" do not apply sole ly 
to civil servaolS but to citizen~ a'i we ll "when they take a stance before 
puhlic forum". 6 Thus, o n the one hand there is the "nhlig-dtion towards 
the citizenship together with the major values of the political sphe re" as 
'' tht: iuc.aJ nf the 'ielf-directed citizenship in the way tboug,ht of hy cvcry-
hody to be acceptable by everybody fo r goou rca~nn, .. , '~"7 while on the 
other there a re " the LimiLs L<i the puh lic use of reason~ which citizens 
must g~ncrally rc-..pect because " it is demanded by cettaiu funuamcntal 
rights and freedom o r because it is cenuaJ fo r Lhc realization of a major 
value".18 
Rawls i)\ kt:en on proving th::n citizens accept the iucal of the public 
use of reason "no t as a compromisl: nr modus vivendi but on the basis 
of their own int(;lll;ctual, comprehensive beliefs'•.l9 By ndmitting l.hc ohli-
gations towards the citizenry and the limits to the puhlic nse of reason in 
" the key constitutional precept. and the issues of fundamental justice", he 
rightly dis tances him ·elf from both the commonseu. ic~1l pra~:,rrnatic under-
standing, according to which it is pcrfcc.lly in o rder if "citizens vote in ac-
cordance with the ir ()(;ial preferences and eco nomic interests'', and from 
th~ iucnlngical ario;tocratic or autocratic understauujng. ;1ccording to which 
dti7en shouJd vote first hand '·on tht: basi1-. of their comprehensive be-
hefs" without taking into com.ident tion .. public arguments". By referring tu 
Rousseau. accc.mling to whom we tdeally give our vnlc to the a lternative 
"which best serves common good'', Rawl" eventually justifies his ideaJ of 
the public use nf re<I'•On since "citizens have voioJJte gcfmfrnl aimed at the 
14 lhicl ., p. 6. 
I~ rbiu., p. 15. 
16 Ibid .. p. 6. 
11 Chid.. p. K 
t il I hid, p. f.} 
I ll Ibid., p. 9. 
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colllmon good which, in turn, is defined by the basic interests which are 
common to all citizens".20 
On the basis of only these few thoughts from Rawls' latest work we 
could conclude that the dispute between the liberal and the communitar-
ian understanding of the principles of freedom and justice, basic interests 
o f citizens and common good is finally behind us. However, Rawls' 
" liberal political concept of juslice in iL-; hrnat.lest sense" does not define 
only the basic principle.s but "the content of the public reason'' as well. 
In thi~ way certain fundamental rights, freedoms and oppot1unities, known 
in liberal-democratic societies of the west are fostered; for example "e4ual 
political and civil liberties, equality of opportunities, social equality, eco-
nomic reciprocity, common good and everything necessaty for the realiza-
tion of these values". Rawls termed these values " the valnes of political 
justice'' since they forlll the basic structure of liberal political concept. 
Besides this basic structure of the justice principle, the lihcral political 
concept includes " the guidelines and the criteria by means of which citi-
zens may ucciuc whetJwr certain material principles have been applied and 
which laws serve them best". RHwls e<tUs these guidelines and criteria "the 
values of the public use of the reason''; they are, of c.ourse, "accompanied 
hy the corrcspomling political virlut:s of sagacity and the reacliJ1ess to ful-
fill the moral obligation towards citizenship''.21 
lt is extreme ly important to keep in mind this difference between the 
;'basic structure" and " the guidelines and the criteria " of the liberal politi-
cnl concept since it can help smoothing out the "differences of the 
opinions regarding which principle is most suitable to the public use of 
the reason" so that it is possible "to have a different opinion about the 
principles and yet agree on tbe more general aspects of a concept. Thus 
we agree th at citizens, freely and e'pmlly, participate in political power 
and they, as reasonable and rational beings have the duty to avail them-
selves of the public reason, though we might disagree as to which prin-
ciples of juslicc make lhc most reasonahle foundation for puhlic juslifica-
tion".22 Naturally, "the purpose of the ideal of the public use of reason 
is to enable citizens to ground their basic argumentation within the 
framework of whal each of them regards as the political concept of jus-
tice, i.e. as the concept which relies on the values for which it may be 
reasonably expected that others accept lht:rn ant.! tJml people are tnJiy 
rel.ldy to defend them. Thus each of us has to be able to state the cri-
terion underlying his/her decisions, and which principles and guidelines al-
low us lO r~asnnah ly l!xpcct lhc a!:.rrccment of otbers".21 
20 Thid., p. 9. 
21 Ibid., pp. 10-12. 
22 Ibid., p. 12. 
23 l bicf. 
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Of course, Rawls knows that the public use of reason often does oot 
lead to a single hut a plt;thma of answers and rightfully points out that 
it should not be given up on as soon as there are differences of opinion. 
On the other band, getting a fuJJ answer does not mean thal the.; sphl!rc 
of the political should be thrown aside and the key constitutional aspects 
and the issue of basic justice infringed upon, since according to the fun-
damental principles of political liberalism, our wranglings and 
"expostulations must occur withjn the framework of political concepts and 
we must sincerely hope that our views are hasecl on the political values 
which rem;onably give rise to the expectation that others ;~gree with 
them".24 ln such a way we do not only realize the "elementary demo-
cn.tLic values" hut, hy fulfilling onr obligations towards the citizenry we 
maintain " the a!Jiance of political friendship" .25 
Here it is not possible to dt:lvt: further inln Rawls' political liheralism 
or his focus on the "alliance of political friendship" which semantically is 
reminiscent of Alistotle ·s notion of politica l friendship. 26 As an example of 
typical modern thinking, Rawls' umll!rs1aoding of " political friendship" as 
weU as of politics in general is different from that of classical Greek 
philosophers and particularly from Aristolk's conccpL'i. Now let us look 
inln Walz!.!r's "comrrmnitarian critique of liberalism ''. 
instead of analyzing Michael Walzer's major work Spberes of J'ustic~J, 
we shall outline on.ly his central postula te and the differences between 
him and Rawls. He writes about this in his Foreword to the German 
edition of Sphlire11 der GereclJtigkeit of 1994: "Simply, lherc is nut H 
si11gle fair rule of tlist·ribution or a consistent attitude to the rules of dis-
tribution according to which a ll goods which are in high demanu today 
could be distributed. This is my pni11l nf tlivergence with John Rawls and 
other philosophers, whose 'principles of justice' should serve as the 
grounds for the distribution of all major goods. Contrary to this, T advo-
cate the authenticity of the principles of justice and the autonomy of in-
dividual spheres of distribution. None of the rules of distribution can 
claim universal applicability; nevertheless, there is Lhe universal procedural 
rule: each good should be allocatetl according to the criteria valid in its 
own 'spher!.!"'.27 From the politic.al standpoint the most important aspect 
of this is that not only the same goods in Jiffer!.!nt societies require dif-
ferent rules of distribution but also that "different goods within the same 
sociely require different distribution rules". Due to this Walzer cundudcs 
24 Ibid., p. 13. 
25 I hid_, p. 18. 
26 Com:eruing Aristullc's practical philosophy and friendship, see my work on 
''Ethics aod Friendship' ' in: FJ1ozofska istraiivuaja, 52, Zagreb, 1994, pp. 5-25. 
27 M. Walzer, Spbiinm der Gerechtigkeit. Ein Plwi.luyc;r filr Plurah.tiit u.nd 
Gfcichbcit, Campus, Fran kfurt, 1994, p.12. 
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that we have ro separate various social sphacs and take care as much as 
possible that •·their bountluric. do nn t overlap" . 
These Walzer's attitudes regarding the uniqueness and ·eparateness of 
individual spheres and spheres of sucial goods and the "valid criteria" ac-
cording to which these g(lUcls should be aUoca.tecl, link his theo ry not only 
to Anglo-Saxon empiricist and pragmatist tratlition, from John Locke tO 
John Dewey (which Wal.ter himself admits) but also to the gram] tnu.lilion 
of Eurupcan cuntinental practical philosophy, primarily with that of Arts-
lot te and l legel and their concept or the ultimate good as the human 
good. Mo re ahout thi\ la ter, since we are more inte n:s tcd in Walzer 's 
t:ri tique of Hberalism. 
Regarding rite present-day controversy between liberalism amJ eommuni-
Larianism, Axel IIonneth correctly noticed that the o pen problems in that 
dispute have "nowhere bt:t: ll helter defined" than in Michael Walzer 's ptt-
per •·communita ri an critiC]ne of liberalism'\ publishctl in his r~nthology o t 
works on cummunitarianism. Of special irtlere~l is the fact that Walzer " in 
his attempt to justify li b~.: ra l sochtl system tries to put forth some empiri-
cal argumc ul!o.". Honneth underlines the significance uf that empirical ar-
gument in Walzer's political theu ry with the fo llowmg sentence: .. Titc fact 
that liberal social S)il\lcm..: have proved resistant to those prn<.:eo;ses of m-
dividualiLation and disassociation whicb wen: triggered off by their own 
principles is due to the fact tlta t in the meantime tbe o rientation LUwartl!> 
the ethic good of individual freed om bas become the cure of the collec-
tive value linkage in modem Western .-;m:icties.. ·•1.A 
For us in Central Europe, who of lately have increasingly heen adopt-
ing not only ahslrttct moral postulates but ''e thic good of individual free-
dom " as well, it is of great importance to become aware that such an 
··orientation towards empirical argument'' means thnt our societies ca n be-
come "the cure of collective value linkage" only if liberal social system!> 
''actually" prove resistant to their uwn "processes o f individuali:r..a tiu n and 
disassociation". So, if we ;tre true partisans of '"ethic good of individual 
freedom", Wal.ter '. political theory of justice il\ of interest to us as well. 
thuugh we till lag behind the devd uped societies o f the We!o.l. Desp ite 
this. or perhaps due tu thio;;, on the basis of our m'rn cultural traditions 
and history w e; have a possibility to shorten the developmental .. p rocesses 
of individualization and disas. ocitttinn'' and, even mo re important , modify 
them in accordance with our historica l tradition Hnd the increasing muJ-
ticulturaJity of today's world. 
Walzer illustrates the situation in modern socie ties of the West by us-
mg J\ruerican social life as an example. He describes what bas happened 
to numerous variations of libcrdlism and commu ruta rianism , two major 
theories of comernpomry (at first American b ut now worldwide) pra<.'tical 
~ A Houncth (cd.), Kommunir.uiWJUS. op. ciL, p. 17. 
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philosophy. He lists "their ndvantag~;s which we shoulc1 thirrk through to 
see whether something muld be plaus ibly constructed from difft:rent 
parts".2Q H e hcgins his re flection by claiming that '· finally there could 
h<mlly be any dmsht that we (in rhe USA) Live in a society in which 
there i~ a relatively h.igh level of detachment among people: in other 
words, mdiviuuaJ:. constantly separate oue from another, caught m an of-
Leu solitary and eemingly fortuttous mohility as if in imiration nf the so 
called Brown's motion. In oth~..:r wo rds, we live in a ptofoundly unstahle 
society. The forms lhat this instability (;(j TJ take is best illustral cu by the 
four most prominent types of mobility".30 
Walzer analyses thc!.t: four variation ' of the mobility in American soci-
ety ant! ays that the first, the o called geogr.tphical mobility, shows that 
1\men cans move hou e more frequentJy than o the r nation . Americans are 
not "refuoees but voluntary migratory hiru ·•. Walzer dedu<.'C!. that 
" through this extensive geo&rraphical mobility, their lit: to home and 
homeland h;we, in fn ct, grown eno rmously loose".:H T he seconu, the so 
c.allcu social mobility, among other things implics the precariousnes." of 
" the communal heritage, i.e. hanuing down of beliefs and customs''. 
Clo:.ely linked with the geographical aml social mobiJity is the marital 
mobility wruch leads ro the ero ion of the identity sim;e. due to divorce~ 
and remarriages. many children tlo not get an opporrunily to '' listen to 
permanenr or iuentical life histo ries about people they Jive with' ' .32 The 
fourth is the political mobility which is the conse4uc::ncc of the fact that 
" place of a\>nde, socia l status and family have lost their c.:cnlral value in 
the formation of pcr'-<lllal identity. Ue ing oul<;ide all political o rganization!., 
lihcral citizens vote for the brruupings which seem to them the best advo-
cates of their ideals o r interests".13 
aturaiJy, the mohility and the growth of an individuaJ canno t be re -
duced to these four types of mobility, while liberalism as " the theoretical 
foundation and ju.'\tification" of individmtl development and orientation/> 
should take into consideration the intluence of o ther e<t uses and tnstances 
of the '·ever ponderable motion of int.!ividuals",34 so that the ir uevelop-
ment would not he left at the mercy of the "outcomes of free will" 
WalLer states that ·'in a lib~.;rd l society, like in any o the r society, people 
are born inln different. socially ex'tremcly distinct groups, they ;u c lxm1 
2Y M. Walzer, "Kommtmit.ari~lbt:be Kritik am Liberalismus'', in: 1\. Hoonetb 
(ed.), Knmmuniturismus, op. ciL, p. 164. 
ln Ibid. 
J l Ibid •• p. I fl5. 
32 Ibid. 
33 fbid., p. 166. 
14 Ibid. 
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with certaiJ1 itl~nlilies, male or female, catho lic or Jewish, black, demo-
cratic. working-class, e tc. Many of their later associations (as well as the ir 
la ter careers) are a mere reflection of these basic identities, which a re 
less self-cho ·en than predetermined'". WalLer goes on to say that his aim 
i. nul to set fonh •·a determiniJ.tic argumeotanon- and that liherausm 
facil itates the e cape from the tnherited worlc.l unlike " prelmeral socie-
ties". Tlm~ he rounds this complex subject marte r by the latest definilion 
of libe ra lism: liberalism is Lo a lesser extent defined by "the freedom of 
individuals to lock themselves iJl tO groups ba~cd on their identities than 
hy the freedom to leave these !,'Tnnp · and even the ideotitie.~ bchind''.35 
Walzer ha., hcen trying to moderni.ze lihcmlism and develop its poten-
tial... In order to free liberali!>m from Ill> own " elf-dl:!.'!tntL1.ive teaching", 
he advocates an OL"Ot!.innal communitarinn correction of liberalism as a 
·'selective strcng1hening of those value.-." (whlcb make the esse11ce nf lib-
eralism) or as an effot1 to n.;ali7e " the communal postulates through these 
liberal va lues" .36 Naturnlly, it is important not sole ly for the theory of Jjb-
eralism but fur the practice of libemli:-.m CIS well whether ''the ucsire for 
the a<;sociation of ordinary citircns and the long-term benefits of this as-
sociatton outlive the four maJor types of mohili ty and whether they arc 
up to the challenges of pluralism". Walrer"s opiruon is tha t thi" c.tnnot be 
carried out without ti.Je mediation of the state. In this case the sta te is 
"the agent of mediCttion".37 
However, that agent of meJiHi ion cannot be just any state or s tate 
alone, bu t only "a lihcral state that considers itself a socia lly purposef11l 
alliance" and which provides for Lhe existence of an infinite number of 
other groupings, apart from o r - even better - "despite the triumph of 
individual righL'- despite the fo ur type!> uf mobility which are the manifes-
tation of th<lt triumph'', Acconlmg to Walzer, since the ·e groupings are 
··continually threatened'', the sta te must, "if it wants to remain a liher<~l 
s tate, protect und promote some of them, primariJy those which in their 
appeara nce t~nd objectives besl correspo nd to tb t: common vaJues of lib-
e ral society". Walzer io;, of course, aware thai some serious problt:m s en-
sue t:rom that. but insists that he cliu not arrive to this conclu ·ion "sole ly 
for theoretical reasons" but that " tbe historv of the best Liberal and the 
best social-democratic tates (which arc hecoming identical) ~hows thal 
they have been pursuing exactty these policies, though often in a very un-
satisfaclory manner".38 
JS Ibid., p. 171. 
"l() Ibid., p. 170. 
37 Ibid., p.l72. 
Jll Ibid., p. 173. 
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ln accordance with his theory of liberal, social democratic state, Walzer 
illustrates with concrete examples that, on the other band, trade unions, 
religious communities and neighbourhoods rely on "feelings and beliefs" 
whit;h are " in gt;neral older than the liher11l slate". Naturally, there is the 
open question of "how strong tbe.se feelings and beliefs are and whether 
they are worth preserving" but " it set!ms that the feelings of wmmunality 
and the common faith are much more stable than it was previously 
thought".39 By referring to John Dewey, Walzer advocates "the new de-
centralized and participatory image of liherlil demoenH;y", which necessi-
tates a " major strengthening of local authorities with the aim to stimulate 
the development and the spreading of civic virtues in the pluralist varit:ty 
of social systems. This would mean trying to implement the postulates of 
communality which exist within liberalism since it has more to do with 
John Stuart Mill than Rousseau".40 
In accordance with such Walzer's thinking, the important thing, there-
fore, is the "development and spreading of civic virtues", which will, 
within the mnlt:mporary libe ral plma list society, together with the major 
strengthening of local administration, realize the "postulates of communal-
ity inherent to liberalism" and thus contin ue the tradition of politi(;lll 
thinking ami politi(;ll l t;ulture from Mill to Dewey. This distinguishes Wal-
zer from John Rawls, who is more in line with Rousseau and Kant. As 
we have pointeJ out at Lhe h!!ginning, it is not unimportant which line or 
tradition of liberal and democratic thinking the contemporary renewal and 
development of political liberalism follow. Rega rding Walzer's critique of 
libt!ralism, it is important t.o note that, owing to, first of all, his theory of 
liberal and social democracy, the gap between liberalism and communitari-
anism has been bridged so that liberalism does not Rdvocate an "atomic 
society" nor mere "self-constitution" while communitarianism does not ad-
vocate an empty ''communality thinking" nor a mere "self-socialization'·. 
The overcoming of the one-sidedness of liheralism and comm unitarian-
ism is most obvious in the last chapter of the mentioned Walzer·s study 
i:n which be says that "neither the libera l nnr Lhe wmmunitarian theory 
need the precepts' ' which in the past brought about the opposition be-
tween liberalism and communitari::mism. "What today's liberals are advocat-
ing is not tbe pre-social self, but only the self which is capable of a criti-
cal rcnedion upon the values which have defined its socialization, while 
critics of communitarianism, who have been uoiug just that. can hardly go 
on claiming that socialization is everything". Walzer concludes: "The cen-
tral topic of political th eory is not the constitution of the self but Lhc 
39 ibitl., p. 175. 
40 fbid., p. 175. On Dewey's understanding of liberalism see Ivan Babic, 
PolitiCka ceorij~1 libewlizma, Biblioteka pulitil:k.a misao, Z.agreh, 1971 , particularly 
pp. 127-130 which hrings Dewey's critique of old liberalism. 
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ties formed among th~.: many -.e lf-t:onscious selves. i.e. the panem and tht: 
tmcmre of rheir social rela tions":H 
Regardi11g the right of the individual to "free association·· and the 
with<l rawaJ from the existing relarions and social foams of comJuct, which 
art! iJlustrated in the contemporary pluraJiNt liher;~l-democratic societies of 
the developeu Wcstcm world hy the a lready mentioned types of mobility 
in American society, Walzer cautions that " the more un. tablt:! our rcl<~tions 
are, the easier they change. Tbe four typ~.:s of mobility pull us into their 
orbit, the socie ty neve r s rups its motion, so that the real subject o f the 
Jiber;ll practice is not a pre-social OUt a lmost a po~t--;(ICial SUbject, an in-
dividual finally liberutetl from all perm<tnently ingr~uoed infinite set of 
Li~;.,".4 2 The major bone of contention between the liheml' and their 
commurutarian critics now appean. in a different light of the 
·•fragmentatiml nf liber<tl society~ which is, according to Walzer, directly 
re flected " in tbe liberal self', which is '"d t:!t:ply \uhdetennined, split from 
within and thus forcetl tn reinvent itself at every public occasion. Some:: 
lih~.:mls prai e tha t freedom and the possibility of continual . e lf-reinvention. 
wbiJe communu an ans shed bitter tc::ar. uver it, rhough ar the same time 
they insist it does not exist since such a state cannot be coadition hu-
ma tiu:" . .u 
ln such novel circumstances, huw~.:vcr, one should start from the moll-
ern liberal socit: Ly and its types of mobility, since it is " the only society'' 
Llwl mu~1 communitarinns really ure fnmjJiar with, i.e. the vuy " liberal as-
sociation of associations, whose composition is increasingly uncertt~in ttnd 
threate ncu". So, cornmunitarians "cannot triumph liVer such liberaUsm; 
what they can do is from time to time increase its inner capacity for al>-
sociation. This incrcu~c is always only temporary since:: Lht: capacity for 
disa. ncialinn i' no less firmJy internalized and highly nppreciated. This is 
the reason why communitarian crili<JIH.! i doomed to a perpetual rever.nl 
perhaps after aJI nnt l>,lch a te rrible fate".44 ln that conjt:cLure the lib-
eral am.l the <:ommururarians of today, and pruhably of tomorrow, find 
common ground, ince they are prnhahly going to a rgue about which val-
ues and capacitie! fo r a: ociation in tbe contemporary liheral-democratic 
society tn nurture, which injustices and capacities for disassociation to re-
pr~ss in order not only to pre.'-.crvc rhe modern communal life hut l o ~n­
su re its free and v<~ried development and promotion as the contemporary 
human existence. 
4 1 M. Walzer, ibid., p. 179_ 
42 I hid_ 
·13 Ibid. 
~ Ibid., p. 180. 
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The most important outcome of the debate about American political 
philosophy of the las t decade for us Europeans - at least for those who 
in that same periou Jist!usst!d in Za~:,rreb, Duhrovnik flnd flt European in-
ternational symposiums and congresses about practical philosophy and po-
litical life in Greek polis and modern democracies, abou t the rd<~tion be-
tween the sta te and the civil society, about morality and tradition, about 
mora lity and the public property of reason and political life - is precisely 
the question about this llt!W, rnuucrn <~nd in that sense contemporary 
" posttraditional" way of coexistence which is in various forms achieved by 
free individuals in their states in accordance with their cultural tr<~uitiun, 
lihentl-democnttic practice ;md the state of the world histocy. As is al-
ready known, histOticaJJy developed and really free political life cannot be 
founded solely on moucm civilization, it s individualizations and disassocia-
tions, since, as a contemporary communal life it presupposes the entire 
historical Jebenswelt (in Husserl's words) and requires a "new form of 
mmrnunality", as was recently said by H enning Ottmann. Ottmann envis-
ages the new patriotism and virtues of citizens who will, in thei1· liberal-
democratic states and on the basis of their respective historical tradition, 
n::alize their individual rights and (in Walzer's words) " postulates of com-
munality inherent to liberalism". Thus citizens will avoid "breakJl" i11 lht! 
process of modern emancipation buJ will preserve their newly created free-
doms and develop them fu rther in order to foster not only safe, but free 
and good life. 
Translated by 
Bozka Jakov/ev 
